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Response to Beth Richie’s “Black Feminism, Gender 
Violence and the Build-up of a Prison Nation”  
Kimberly D. Bailey  
I would like to thank Professor Richie for such a provocative and 
inspirational address. With respect to the violence against women 
movement, Professor Richie has always been a voice for those 
women who generally do not have a voice, specifically poor women, 
women of color, and immigrant women. Her insight today that the 
mainstream feminist theorization of domestic violence continues to 
leave them voiceless is a particularly important one. 
I would like to continue her conversation by focusing on the 
concept of privacy. I use this term in the same sense that liberal 
theorists use it, as a representation of a sphere that is inappropriate 
for government intrusion.
1
 As other scholars have noted, this concept 
has been somewhat complicated in the context of women’s rights.2 
On the one hand, the concept of decisional privacy—or what some 
prefer to call liberty—is the foundation for such rights as 
contraceptive use and abortion.
3
 On the other hand, privacy 
historically was also used to justify inaction on the part of the police, 
judges, and prosecutors in response to women who would seek 
intervention from the criminal justice system in order to stop the 
violence that they were experiencing in their homes.
4
 In other words, 
the privacy of the patriarchal head of the household to run his home 
as he saw fit was valued over the bodily integrity of the wife. 
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Arguing that “the personal is political,” feminists in the 1960s and 
1970s rejected the notion that violence in the home was a private 
matter.
5
 Instead, they argued that the reason women could be victims 
in their own homes was because of the political subordination of 
women as a class in society.
6
 Furthermore, by not intervening when 
women experienced violence in the home, the state was actually 
complicit in this violence and subordination.
7
 Therefore, for many 
feminists the notion of a dichotomy between a public sphere where 
government regulation was appropriate and a private sphere where it 
was not was a false one because these spheres are actually 
interrelated.
8
 Other feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon argued 
that the private sphere needed to be completely destroyed because the 
notion of privacy was really something that applied to men to the 
detriment of women.
9
 
The problem with destroying the private, however, is that the 
more governmental intrusion that occurs in one’s life, the less 
decisional privacy one has. This often leads to serious negative 
consequences. This particularly has been the story of poor women 
and women of color who historically have had very little privacy, and 
this phenomenon can be illustrated by what happened in the battered 
women’s movement. By arguing that violence against women in the 
home was actually a public issue, feminists justified the need for 
intervention from the criminal justice system.
10
 But they encountered 
police officers, prosecutors, and judges who still viewed violence in 
the home as a private matter and refused to enforce the law against 
batterers.
11
 In response, mandatory arrest and prosecution policies 
were created and police and prosecutors were strongly encouraged or 
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required to arrest and to prosecute if there was probable cause of 
domestic abuse.
12
 Now, I do not believe that these policies were 
instituted because of mainstream feminist theorization on privacy. 
Instead, I believe that they were implemented because they fit in with 
the conservatization of the criminal justice system that was already 
occurring in the 1980’s and 1990’s that created a heavy focus on 
arrest and prosecution. Nevertheless, many feminists still justify these 
policies based on this idea that domestic violence is a public issue.
13
 
I do not want to minimize the importance of improving the 
institutional response of the criminal justice system to domestic 
violence. But when the concept of privacy is completely ignored, one 
finds greater governmental intrusion, less decisional privacy, and 
serious consequences. This is exactly what has occurred under 
mandatory policies. The reality is that poor women and women of 
color are already more likely to be on the radar of the criminal justice 
system because they often live in cramped conditions with thinner 
walls that make it impossible to hide what is going on inside or 
because they are receiving government benefits that subject them to 
greater state scrutiny. As a result, these women are more apt to 
experience these negative consequences. First, when women have no 
voice in whether their batterer is arrested or prosecuted, they risk 
serious economic consequences. It is estimated that when a woman 
leaves her batterer, there is a fifty percent risk that she will live below 
the poverty level.
14
 A significant number of those in the homeless 
population are domestic violence victims and their children.
15
 In 
addition, it is not clear that arresting abusers makes the victims safer; 
there is some research that suggests that it may make the abuse worse 
for some victims.
16
 And currently, there is a horrible phenomenon 
happening where once the criminal justice system becomes aware of 
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abuse in the home, the victim can be punished for neglect and may 
have her children taken away.
17
 
As a result, more theorization is needed to explain why women 
are entitled both to state intervention, should they want its assistance 
to stop the violence in their lives, and some decisional privacy in 
deciding how best to extricate themselves from a violent relationship. 
Some feminists have argued for an affirmative right of privacy in the 
domestic violence context that justifies state intervention on the basis 
of a victim’s affirmative right to bodily integrity.18 But I am making a 
normative plea for an affirmative right to choose how to deal with the 
violence in one’s life, including limiting the involvement of the 
criminal justice system.
19
 In order to ensure women’s safety, 
however, limiting the intrusiveness of the criminal justice system 
means that we are going to have to come up with creative grassroots 
alternatives reminiscent of the early battered women’s movement, 
which focused on providing shelter and material support to victims. 
In addition, to the extent that these alternatives are based on state 
funding, we need to make sure that these methods do not result in the 
same level of intrusiveness that occurs when individuals seek state 
help. 
 
 17. See Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and Children: Deconstructing the Myth 
of the Passive Battered Mother and the “Protected Child” in Child Neglect Proceedings, 58 
ALB. L. REV. 1087, 1088–90 (1995). 
 18. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF 
PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 53 (Martha Alberston Fineman & 
Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994). 
 19. I plan to explore this affirmative right to privacy in future articles. 
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